ABSTRACT Recently, researchers become increasingly interested in studying cooperation in evolutionary game theory by learning people's behavior patterns in real world. One of the patterns is that when some people contribute more to a group, their behaviors are more likely to be imitated by their neighbors. Inspired by this, we introduce a preferential selection mechanism that players have higher probability in learning from their contributed counterparts. We follow the lattice arrangement of players and conduct spatial prisoner's dilemma game. We define the contribution of individual by the payoffs of his four neighbors, and a larger value corresponds to greater contribution. In strategy updating stage, we first calculate the contribution of all players, and then, for each player, we propose one of his neighbors to imitate according to their contribution. At last, we decide to imitate or not by Femi's dynamics. The simulations have justified our acclaim that imitating contributed players can prompt cooperation. This paper helps us understand why and how cooperation emerges in real world.
I. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of cooperation exists extensively in nature and human society [1] , [2] . It represents the sacrifice of individuals but benefiting their counterparts, and thus it is confusing since most of the members in a group are selfish. Evolutionary game theory provides a theoretical framework for researchers to study why and how players choose to cooperate instead of defection [3] - [12] . It focuses on how equilibrium is reached in repetitive gaming of selfish individuals. During the game, players learn and adapt their behaviors to optimize their payoffs.
In game theory, the following three models are studied for most, namely, prisoner's dilemma game, snowdrift game, and public good game. Our work focuses on prisoner's dilemma game [13] , and we briefly introduce this model here. In this game, all players have only two choices, namely, to cooperate or to defect. If a pair of neighbors choose cooperation at the same time, their payoffs are both R. If both of them choose to defect, their payoffs are both P. In contrast, if one chooses to cooperate while the other one to defect, their payoffs are S and T, respectively. Generally, the values of T , R, P, S are set to have the following relationship that T > R > P > S, and T + S < 2R [14] . In this setting, the Nash equilibrium [15] is reached when all players choose to defect. The reason is no matter how neighbors choose their strategies, the largest payoffs are obtained when selfish individuals choose defection. Hence, the equilibrium of prisoner's game is defection for all players. However, this strategy cannot benefit the group most. Obviously, this model describes a typical dilemma in real world.
In order to study why and how cooperation emerges and maintains in certain level, researchers proposed all sorts of evolution mechanisms. Early research is mainly about the network topology and its influence on cooperation. They fixed the network topology and evolution rules and studied how the cooperation frequency was affected by these factors when equilibrium was reached. Two important types of networks are complex networks [16] - [19] and regular networks [20] , [21] . Recently, researchers shift to introduce social phenomenon into evolutionary models to discover the influence of these phenomenon and fruitful results are obtained. For example, Rong et al. [22] showed cooperation frequency can be improved when players' time scale of updating strategies are adapted according to historical information. It is shown by [23] that education can also improve cooperation frequency. Inspired by the ''win-stay, lose-shift'' philosophy, Liu et al. [24] introduced personal expectation on lattice that when some player is not satisfied with his payoff, he will imitate some of his neighbors, otherwise, he keeps his strategy unchanged. It is showed that this strategy updating rule can prompt cooperation. Du et al. [25] showed that in asymmetric cost evolutionary games, cooperation can be prompted harder when cooperators have more neighbors. It is believed that asymmetric payoffing improves leaders' influence by heterogeneous wealth distribution. Considering the influence of individual heterogeneity in real world, Du et al. [26] introduced a novel priority selection mechanism into evolutionary games on scale-free networks. Experiments showed that cooperation can be prompted when players tend to imitate larger degree neighbors. Xia et al. [27] studied three different updating rules, namely, the unconditional imitation, the replicator dynamics, and the Moran process. They showed that comparing to the other two rules, Moran process can considerably improve the cooperation rate of groups. Moreover, they showed that cooperation frequency increased remarkably when moderate randomness was introduced.
Besides, Wang et al. [28] introduced reputation of players into evolutionary games and claimed that this mechanism prompted cooperation if players choose to imitate neighbors who have high reputation. Furthermore, Lu [29] studied the relationship between individual choice and the reputation distribution. Chen et al. [30] considered individual reputation and diversity when strategy was updated. Simulation illustrated that the cooperation can be greatly enhanced by adaptive reputation assortment. The evolution of cooperation and risk analysis is also one of the topics that researchers focus on [31] . In this work, the authors showed that player's reputation obviously lowered the risk of being exploited and thus dominated the evolution. In human society, representatives are always selected on behalf of the interest of some individuals or groups. Inspired by this fact, Milinski et al. [32] showed that extortion can prompt cooperation. Later, Xu et al. [33] showed extortion can prompt cooperation in both lattice and scale-free networks. Li et al. [34] showed that smart players can prompt cooperation. In their work, ''smart'' players denote those who consider not only their neighbors' payoffs, but also their neighbors' circumstance. There are also works showed the tendency or preferences of neighbors' can prompt cooperation [35] , [36] . It is also showed that compassion can boost cooperation [37] . Wang and Perc [38] introduced a priority selection mechanisms to evolutionary games. It is shown that cooperation can be prompted when players tend to imitate higher payoff neighbors. On the contrary, if players tend to imitate lower payoff neighbors, cooperation can be deprecated, or even to be annihilation. Guan et al. [35] studied how players select neighbors. By introducing a non-linear attraction factor, they showed that this factor has the ability to prompt cooperation. Different from [35] , Ren et al. [39] introduced a novel preference mechanism on scale-free networks, which selects a neighbor with the probability proportional to his degree. Experiments showed this mechanism can prompt cooperation.
However, none of these work considered the contributions of neighbors and how contributed neighbors influence the dynamics of games. Hence, we introduce a novel mechanism that the probability of a neighbor to be selected is defined according to his contribution. This mechanism is inspired by the fact that people who make greater contributions always have higher reputation and thus other people tend to imitate their behavior. We show this mechanism has the ability to prompt cooperation and maintain cooperation in games by experiments.
In short, we propose a new evolution mechanism according to which players in the lattice select their contribution neighbors to imitate. Our intuition bases on the fact that in Femi dynamics, players choose a neighbor randomly, and copy his strategy with probability (1). However, if players choose their neighbors in a ''clever'' way i.e., to choose the one who contribute the most, cooperation can be maintained in the equilibrium. We will describe our model in detail in the next section and explain why this mechanism encourages cooperation. Experiment results justify our intuition that cooperation frequency is higher when we impose a higher probability on the contributed players.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the evolution mechanism in detail and analyses why this mechanism works. Section 3 shows the experiments and their results and some analysis of the results. We conclude the paper in Section 4.
II. MODEL AND ANALYSIS A. MODEL DESCRIPTION
In this work, we confine ourselves to lattice setting, which means that all the players are arranged in a lattice. There are also researches where the players are arranged in a scalefree network, but because we focus on how cooperation is prompted and maintained, rather than the network topology, the lattice setting is sufficient. Concretely, we assume the players are arranged in a lattice which is shown in Figure 1 , and we assume the players iterate the following steps until the whole system reaches its equilibrium.
• With current strategies, players play with their neighbors.
• Players update their strategies according to some law. One of the most famous updating strategies is the Femi dynamics [21] . It encourages players to copy their neighbors' strategies who receive more payoffs than themselves.
If player A and B 1 respectively have payoffs P(A) and P(B 1 ) in some iteration, then with probability
that A copies B 1 's strategy. It is obvious that when P(B 1 ) > P(A) the probability Pr(B 1 → A) is higher. The parameter κ in (1) represents the irrationality of players. When κ ↓ 0, players are perfectly rational and they only copy neighbors with higher payoffs. On the contrary, when κ increases, players tend to be more irrational and they may learn from neighbors with lower payoffs. Xu et al. [40] showed that when κ < 0.01, players become totally rational while κ > 0.2 players become very irrational. Thus, we follow the usual setting that κ = 0.1 like [41] .
In our model, we arrange all the players in a L × L square lattice with periodic boundaries and conduct spacial prisoner's dilemma game. Following conventional weak prisoner's assumption, we set P = S = 0, R = 1, and 2 > T > 1, where T is a turnable parameter. T is called the temptation because it represents the payoff when its associated player defects. Initially, we set half of the players defect randomly, and the other half cooperate. Then they begin to play and evolve. In each time step, every player plays with his neighbors, accumulate payoffs, and update his strategy.
In this paper, we focus on the evolution step. We define the contribution of a player to his neighbors by the summation of the payoffs of his neighbors. For example, the contribution of B 1 in Figure 1 is S(B 1 ) = P(C 1,1 )+P(C 1,2 )+P(C 1,3 )+P(A). Then we define the probability of B 1 being selected as a candidate to A is proportional to exp[S(B 1 )K 1 ], where K 1 is a parameter. Suppose B 1 is a candidate of A, then A imitates his strategy following the formal Femi dynamics like equation (1) . Formally, the update step is comprised of the following steps: 1) Calculate the contributions of S(B 1 ), S(B 2 ), S(B 3 ), S(B 4 ). 2) For i = 1, 2, 3, 4, compute the candidate probability
FIGURE 1. The lattice where players are arranged.
3) Select a candidate using equation (2). 4) Suppose B i is selected as a candidate, then A copies his strategy with probability (1).
B. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION STRATEGY
Comparing with formal Femi dynamics, the major difference is that we choose the contribution neighbor using equation (2) rather than randomly. Hence, the effect of equation (2) plays a key role. We first consider an extreme case that K 1 = 0, then p(B i ) = 1/4 for all the neighbors. It means that the Femi dynamics is recovered when K 1 = 0. On contrast, when
) is the greatest among A's four neighbors. Hence, K 1 represents the likelihood for A to choose a neighbor with more contributions. Now we explain why imitating contributed players' strategies prompts cooperation. Let's consider two choices of cooperation or defection for B 1 . When B 1 chooses to cooperate, its neighbors' payoffs can be T or R depending on its associated neighbors' choices. On the other hand, if B 1 chooses to defect, then its neighbors' payoffs can only be P or S. Note that in the weak prisoner's dilemma we set T > R > P > S, the contribution of B 1 is greater if he chooses to cooperate than to defect, hence, A is always recommended the one with a higher probability of cooperation. It implies that A has to imitate his cooperation neighbors' strategies with a higher probability.
III. EXPERIMENTS
All the experiments are conducted in a 100 × 100 lattice, and the initial states are set to be cooperation or defection evenly. In every time step, players play the game with their four neighbors and accumulate payoffs. In the first experiment, we focus on the temptation T and the parameter K 1 and their effects on the ratio of cooperation when equilibrium is reached. The parameter κ in equation (1) is fixed to κ = 0.1. In Figure 2 , the value of cooperation frequency is the mean of the stable values of ten experiments. The iteration number is set to be 2,000 and we record the mean of the cooperation frequency of steps 1,001 to 2,000.
Obviously, we can see that the ratio of cooperation decreases with T increases for all different values of K 1 . On the other hand, the ratio of cooperation goes up when K 1 rises. This result is consistent with our analysis in Subsection 2.2 since K 1 controls the probability of choosing a contribution neighbor. It can be seen that when K 1 = 0, the model is reduced to the formal Femi dynamics, and cooperation is maintained in equilibrium only when T = 1; and if T > 1, cooperation disappears. For comparison, when K 1 = 0.2, cooperation exists in equilibrium until T is set to be close to 1.5. Furthermore, when K 1 ≥ 0.4, cooperation exist for all T ≤ 1.5.
In Figure 3 we show how ρ C is changed with time passes by. It is obvious that ρ C is larger when T is set to be smaller values and when K 1 is set to be larger values. In contrast, when T is too large or K 1 is too small, ρ C is driven to be small in equilibrium.
Our third experiment is used to show the ratio of accepting a recommendation for different values of K 1 and T . In the evolution stage, player A is first recommended a neighbor in
Step 3, and then accept or reject it in Step 4. Here, we define the accept ratio ρ R = R/L 2 , where R is the number of players who accepts the recommended neighbor's strategy and L 2 is the number of players in the game. It is easy to see that ρ R represents the stability of the model. The larger ρ R is, the more unstable the model is. We need to notice that equilibrium does not mean ρ R = 0, since there may be equal 53268 VOLUME 6, 2018 number of players who convert to cooperation from defectal and vice versa.
In Figure 4 (a) and Figure 4 (b) we fix T = 1.05 and T = 1.5 and show the acceptance ratio for different values of K 1 . Obviously, ρ R decreases with time passes because the model is settling down. Comparing ρ R for fixed T and different K 1 , we know that when K 1 is set to smaller values, ρ R declines rapidly in both cases. We then fix K 1 = 0.02 and K 1 = 0.1 and show ρ R for different values of T in Figure 4 (c) and Figure 4 (b). Consistent with our intuition, ρ R falls quickly when T is set to be larger values, and ρ R falls slower when T is smaller.
The reason behind this observation is that when T is a large value comparing to K 1 , cooperation annihilates rapidly, and then model settle down. However, when T is smaller comparing to K 1 , cooperation always exist and these players affect their neighbors' choice. With similar reason, defection should also exist. From our other experiments. we know equilibrium always reach before 200 iterations, but the acceptance rate are greater than 0 in some cases. This observation tells us that for these cases, the equilibrium is a dynamic balance. It means that same fraction of cooperators and defectors convert to their counterparts.
The last experiment is to show how defection players convert to cooperation when the initial stations are set to have special structure. In Figure 5 and Figure 6 we show the snapshots of strategies with different number of iterations for square and rhombus initializations. In these figures, t denotes the number of iterations and white and black cells represent cooperation and defection, respectively. In both experiments, we set T = 1.3 and K 1 = 0.3. The first 5 subfigures are selected every 40 iterations to show the tendency of the evolution. However, because the evolution always reach equilibrium before 200 iterations and thus all the snapshots are similar, we only display the one in iteration 1,000. We can see from these figures that there are only a small area in the center that players are set to cooperation while the rest are defectal. According to our evolution mechanism, more and more players convert to cooperation with time pass by. Clearly, these figures demonstrate that our evolution mechanism encourages players to choose cooperation instead of defection and maintain this trend to equilibrium.
IV. CONCLUSION
Recently, one of the research hot-spots in the evolution game theory is to introduce some characteristic of human society and study when and how cooperation is prompted and maintained. Inspired by this trend, we proposed a model that the contribution players are selected and imitated by their neighbors with higher probabilities in the process of evolution. Concretely, we repeated prisoner's dilemma game in a lattice over and over again until equilibrium is reached. In the evolution step, we impose the contribution players higher probabilities to be selected before Femi dynamics is applied. As we wish, the experiment results show that this evolution mechanism benefits both prompt and maintain cooperation. Besides, we find that the equilibrium is a dynamic balance by showing the acceptance rate. We hope this work can provide a better understanding of the evolution dynamics. 
